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Practical reasons play a central role in our everyday 
discourse about action and there is no major ethical 
theory into which the concept of reasons for action 
does not play a crucial role. However, the nature of 
reasons for acting is not well understood. Th e aim 
of the present essay is therefore to clarify the notion 
of justifi catory reasons for action. To accomplish 
this, I start, after some preliminaries, from a widely 
shared but oversimplifi ed model of practical 
reasoning. On this view, we have a reason for acting 
if this action is a necessary and available means to 
bring about one of our ends. I show that this view 
is mistaken. In particular, I argue that, contrary to 
prevailing opinion, desires do not provide an agent 
with justifying reasons for action. By discussing 
the necessary conditions for justifi catory reasons, I 
outline an account of practical reasons that is more 
sophisticated and more accurate than most theories 
of desire-dependent reasons, neo-Humeanism 
included.
Keywords: practical reasons, reasons for action, 
instrumental reasons, reasons for acting, neo-Hu-
meanism
You are on a mountaineering holiday in 
the Alps. Between the climbs you stay in 
a mountain hut. After a hard climb you 
enjoy a hot shower in the afternoon. But 
you can take the shower only if you switch 
on the geyser in the morning before you 
leave the hut. Since it is natural to think 
that if you desire some state of aff airs 
you have a reason to do what you can 
to bring about that state of aff airs, many 
writers in the fi eld of practical reasoning, 
notably neo-Humeans, hold that, in the 
circumstances, you have a pro tanto reason 
for turning on the geyser. It turns out, as 
we shall see, that this is a misguided view.
In this article, I shall start from this 
oversimplifi ed model of practical reasons 
and work it up into something more 
adequate by adding refi nements. In this 
way I hope to present a more satisfying 
account of what it is for an agent to have 
a reason for acting. Before getting into 
the details, however, I must make some 
preliminary remarks.
1. Some Preliminaries
Reasons for acting play a central role in 
our everyday discourse about action and 
it can be said without exaggeration that 
there is no major ethical theory of any sort 
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into which the concept of reasons for action does not enter is some way or other. 
Nonetheless, the nature of reasons for acting is not well understood and since the term 
‘reason’ is used in a variety of contexts meaning diff erent things, philosophical writing 
is often unclear about what counts as a reason. Some terminological clarifi cation is 
thus in order.
(i) It takes little familiarity with philosophical discussions of the concept of reasons 
for acting to know that there are competing theories of normative reasons. (In this 
essay, I have nothing to say about explanatory reasons, which we use for explanations 
of actions.) A common way of classifying theories of such reasons is by distinguishing 
those that ground reasons in the agent’s subjective valuational states and those which 
deny this grounding or claim that not all practical reasons need to be based on such 
subjective states. On the former view, the ultimate source of reasons for an agent is in 
the subjective valuations of that agent (Hubin 1999). Th is is, of course, the view of 
what has come to be called the neo-Humean theory of practical reason. It is fair to say, 
however, that this account of desire-dependent (or “internal”) reasons has attracted 
considerable critique from authors who deny that all normative reasons are dependent 
on the agent’s valuations. Searle (2001) and other so-called externalists argue that 
there are desire-independent reasons also.1 I will not try to settle this dispute here. 
My discussion in this paper will start from a desire-dependent reason, but I wish to 
emphasize that this does not commit me to internalism.
(ii) Generally speaking, normative reasons for action are considerations in favour of 
some act.2 It is, however, important to notice that we need to draw a distinction between 
two kinds of normative reasons. In a traditional terminology, this diff erence has been 
made by distinguishing between the notions of there being a reason for an agent’s acting 
in a certain way and an agent’s having a reason for acting that way (see Grice 1978).3 
In current jargon, these types of normative reasons have been labelled objective and 
subjective reasons. In short, subjective reasons refer to the agent’s circumstances as he 
sees them. Objective reasons, on the other hand, apply to his circumstances as they 
actually are. You have an objective reason for φ–ing if φ–ing is actually a (necessary) 
means to one of your ends. Th at is to say, objective reasons depend on facts (including 
facts about an agent’s valuational states), while subjective reasons are commonly said 
to be grounded in beliefs about these facts.4
1  Internalism can be defi ned as the view “that an agent has a reason to x if and only if x-ing is connected, via delibera-
tion (correctly performed) with an internal feature of the agent.” Externalism, on the other hand, holds “that an agent 
has a reason to x iff  x-ing can be connected, via deliberation, with some aspect of the world which need not be, and 
sometimes is not, an internal feature of the agent” (Hampton 1995, 60).
2   Compare, for instance, Cohon (2000) and Parfi t (1997).
3  See also Kearns and Star (2008) and Audi (2004) who calls reasons which we have “possessed reasons” (p. 120). 
Many authors blur the distinction between these notions; see, for instance, Beardman (2007), Broome (1999), and 
Williams (2001).
4  Compare also Audi (2001, 53-5), Schroeder (2004), and Sobel (2001). Be it noted that I do not hold that this is 
the only legitimate way to describe the distinction between subjective and objective reasons. For instance, Dancy (2000, 
49-76) gives a diff erent explanation.
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Perhaps it is easiest to grasp this distinction by way of illustration. Since you believe 
that the liquid in the bottle is water, you have a subjective reason to drink it but, as it 
is actually petrol, there is no objective reason for drinking it (Lenman 2009, 4). My 
second example is in terms of the traditional terminology. Suppose Jones decides to 
catch the 3.05 train to London. It may be a fact that the train is going to crash resulting 
in the death of all passengers. And therefore there is a reason for Jones not to take this 
train. But if he has no good reason for thinking that it will crash, “and good reasons 
to think that by catching it he will reach London in time for an appointment, then … 
it cannot be denied that he has a reason, a good reason, for catching that train” (Grice 
1978, 173).
In this essay, my focus is on reasons that an agent has (on his subjective reasons). I 
call such reasons justifi catory reasons because we employ them when we want to show 
that an agent has a justifi cation for acting in a certain way or when we want to justify 
our own actions. Obviously, the fact that the train was going to crash gave Jones no 
justifi cation for not taking it, but his good reasons for thinking that by catching it he 
will reach London in time provided him with a justifi cation for taking it. (I shall say 
more about this later.) Th e aim of this article is now simple to state. I try to determine 
what is required for an agent to have a justifi catory reason for acting.
(iii) Before going on to a detailed consideration of justifi catory reasons, some further 
clarifi cations are called for. First, to keep things as simple as possible, I shall here mainly 
be concerned with reasoning under certainty. Reasoning is said to be under certainty 
if the arguer knows, at least for practical purposes, of each of his options what the 
outcomes of his taking it would be. Certainty is the simplest case of practical reasoning 
because no probabilities enter.
Second, throughout this paper, I shall confi ne my attention to pro tanto reasons. Th at is 
to say, reasons which can be overridden by counter-reasons. I have nothing to say here 
about reasons for acting, all things considered.
Th ird, practical reasoning requires a choice. If we have no choice — when we slip off  
the ladder or when our body is held immobile — then we do not reason what to do. 
Th is may appear so obviously true as to be hardly worth saying, but many authors seem 
to have overlooked this fact, and they therefore refer to “desires” or other monadic 
valuations when they discuss practical reasons. However, when we have to choose 
between diff erent options the relevant valuations are preferences. Th ey are dyadic (or 
comparative) valuings. I take the term ‘a is preferred to b’ to mean that the agent 
assigns more value to a than to b.
Fourth, although justifi catory reasons count in favour of the rationality of actions, 
acting on such a reason is not necessarily rational. It can be quite irrational to act on 
a pro tanto justifying reason. An action may be irrational for a variety of reasons that 
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we cannot here explore. For instance, rationality requires considering options that are 
available. Th at is to say, boxing oneself in with one or two options without considering 
their alternatives makes a choice rationally defective. Furthermore, according to Searle 
(2001, 141), rationality even involves metaphysical issues such as the problem of free 
choice. I am thus not primarily concerned here with the agent’s rationality but with the 
nature of his justifi catory reasons.
Finally, one further point should be made clear at the outset. We need to distinguish 
between two related justifi cational notions that have been called doxastic justifi cation 
and situational (or propositional) justifi cation (see Audi 2003, 3). Roughly, S has doxastic 
justifi cation that p if he believes that p and is justifi ed in believing p. If S has situational 
justifi cation for believing p then it is not implied that S actually believes p. It should be 
noticed that the arguments in this paper are about situational justifi cation. I shall, for 
example, hold that an agent has a justifi catory reason for φ–ing (where ‘φ’ stands in 
for some verb of action or for verb phrases) only if he has a justifi cation for believing 
that φ–ing is a necessary means for achieving one of his ends. Th is does, however, 
not commit me to the stronger view that the agent must justifi edly believe this. As 
Audi (2003, 2-3) explains, however, the two justifi cational notions are intimately 
related: “If one justifi edly believes something, one is also justifi ed in believing it (hence 
has justifi cation for believing it). But the converse does not hold: not everything we 
are justifi ed in believing is something we do believe. When I look at a lawn, I am 
justifi ed in believing it has more than ten blades of grass per square foot, but I would 
not normally have any belief about the number of blades per square foot.” In short, 
situational justifi cation does not imply any belief. I shall use the phrases ‘having a 
justifi cation for believing p’, ‘being justifi ed in believing p’ and ‘having evidence for p’ 
interchangeably. By all of them I mean, roughly, that if S were to believe p solely on the 
basis of his justifying evidence then S would justifi edly believe p.5 
So far, everything in this paper has been a matter of preliminary ground clearing. Now 
we have to go to work on the constructive part.
2. Shaping Up
Let us return to our initial example of your mountaineering holiday. In this section, I 
shall discuss necessary conditions of your having a justifi catory reason for switching on 
the geyser in the morning. Whether the conjunction of these necessary conditions is 
also a suffi  cient condition, is a question which I shall not attempt to decide here. I am 
inclined, however, to think that it is.
5  A similar explication has been given by Coff man (2006). He explains the notion of good evidence as “evidence 
that would render justifi ed a belief in p were S to so believe on its basis” (p. 258). In a slightly diff erent terminology, 
Audi (2001) states that a person has a situational (propositional) justifi cation for believing x “if and only if the person 
has grounds [evidence] for it such that in virtue of believing it on the basis of them the person would be justifi ed in so 
believing” (p. 243n26).
Georg Spielthenner |  Justifi catory reasons for action
60
2.1 Descriptive evidence
Authors often hold, or write as if they hold, that an agent has a reason to φ if φ is a 
(necessary) means for achieving one of his ends. On this view, it is facts that generate 
reasons. For instance, Raz (1978) claims that “I should take this medicine because it 
will alleviate my pain, not because I think that it will do so” (p. 3).6 I think they hold 
this view because they either identify practical reasons with “objective” reasons,7 or 
because they blur the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” reasons.
Th at facts do not give you justifying reasons can easily be shown. Suppose that, 
unbeknownst to you, it is a fact that taking this medicine is necessary for alleviating 
your pain but you have no justifi cation for believing that it is eff ective in your case. I 
think it is clear that you have then no justifi catory reason for taking this medicine (even 
though there may be an objective reason for it), despite the fact that this is a necessary 
means for alleviating your pain.
Some authors hold that it is not facts but beliefs that generate reasons.8 Beardman 
(2007) claims that “if you have an end E, and believe that doing M is a necessary and 
available means to bring about E, then you have a pro tanto reason to M” (p. 257). 
But surely not any belief will give you a reason. If you have good evidence that M is 
not a means to E but you obstinately refuse to accept this evidence, then you have no 
justifi catory reason to M. Th is point may be thought to be rather trivial and obvious, 
but it is worth emphasizing here because it is a common mistake to think that beliefs 
can generate practical reasons.
Justifying reasons require neither facts nor beliefs; they do not even require justifi ed 
beliefs. What we need to have is evidence.9 If you have a justifi cation for believing that 
you can only have the desired hot shower if you switch on the geyser in the morning 
then, I submit, you have a justifi cation for turning it on (given that the other necessary 
conditions are met). Th at is to say, I hold that you have neither a justifying reason for 
performing an action if this action is in fact a necessary means for one of your ends 
nor when you believe that it is such a means and you do not even have such a reason 
if the action is actually a means and you believe that it is one. What is required is 
rather a justifi cation for believing that this action is a means to your end. Hampton 
(1995) holds that also on the Humean theory of practical reason the agent must have 
a reason for believing that an action furthers the attainment of an end (p. 57). Th is 
interpretation has been challenged by Hubin (2001) who claims that according to the 
Humean view, it is facts that have the proper relation to ends which create reasons. Be 
that as it may, I think it is uncontroversial that an agent has a justifi catory reason for 
6  Other authors who hold this view include Beardman (2007), Gaus (1990), Hubin (2001), Schroeder (2007), 
Setiya (2007), and Williams (2001).
7  See, for instance, Parfi t (1997) who claims that “if I believe falsely that my hotel is on fi re, it may be rational for 
me to jump into the canal but I may not have a reason to jump” (p. 99).
8  Williams (2001, 78) denounces this view as “the sub-Humean model”, but only because the beliefs might be false 
(not because they might be unjustifi ed).
9  Clearly, a fact need not be evidence. It can be a fact that you are going to die of heart failure if you don’t stop eating 
trans fats, but if you have no reason for believing this then you have no evidence for it.
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φ-ing only if he is justifi ed in believing that φ-ing will further one of his ends.
2.2 Simultaneity of descriptive evidence and action
Contemporary writers on practical reason have often ignored a pervasive and 
important feature of practical reasoning. Th is is its temporal aspect. As we shall see in 
the remainder of this paper, justifi catory reasons are time-relative. In this subsection, I 
am only concerned with one aspect of this time relativity, the required simultaneity of 
the agent’s descriptive evidence (e.g., his evidence that an act is a necessary means for 
achieving one of his ends) and the act in question. I shall argue that an agent must have 
the evidence at the time when he is acting. Th at is to say, to have a reason for switching 
the geyser on, you need to have justifi cation in the morning that you can have the hot 
shower only if you switch it on in the morning. More generally, if you are justifi ed in 
believing that acting at a certain time (call that time, time t0) is necessary for achieving 
one of your ends then you need to have this justifi cation at t0.
My argument proceeds as follows: (i) Suppose that you have the justifi cation some 
time before you act. Yesterday, you were told by a reliable source that you can have the 
hot shower only if you turn the geyser on this morning. Now a moment’s refl ection 
reveals that this did not give you a reason for switching it on yesterday because you had 
evidence that you can have the shower only if you switch it on this morning (which 
does not imply that you can also have it if you turned it on yesterday). Yesterday’s 
justifi cation did not give you a reason for switching the geyser on this morning, too. 
Today you may not be justifi ed any longer because you have obtained evidence that 
the geyser is defective. (ii) Suppose you acquire the justifi cation later. You learn only 
at noon that you could have had a shower if you had switched on the geyser in the 
morning. You can then argue that you should have switched it on at that time (such 
retrospective reasoning is quite common), but it is clear that you did not have a reason 
in the morning (at that time you had no justifi cation) and you have no reason at noon 
(because you are only justifi ed in believing that you could have taken the shower if you 
had switched on the geyser in the morning).
Since neither the evidence an agent has before acting nor his justifi cation after an action 
was required are reason-giving, an agent must have the relevant evidence simultaneously 
with that action. I am not, of course, suggesting that an agent must not have the 
evidence before he acts or that he must not have it after the act was done. I rather hold 
that an agent needs to have the descriptive evidence at the time of acting and only his 
evidence at that time is reason-giving.
2.3 Valuational evidence
Many philosophers think it is both uncontroversial and unproblematic that “internal” 
reasons are based on desires. Th e thesis of desire-based reasons is the essence of the 
neo-Humean theory of practical reasons, and even many of its critics accept that some 
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of our reasons are grounded in our subjective valuations. For instance, Searle (2001) 
holds that his reason for carrying an umbrella is his desire to stay dry and his belief 
that if he has an umbrella he can stay dry (p. 115).10 In this subsection, I shall argue 
that this widely accepted view is mistaken. It is not the fact that an agent prefers x to y 
which generates a reason, but his evidence that he prefers x to y. In order to see why this 
is so, let us go through our example.
(i) Suppose that in the morning you consider turning on the geyser and that you have 
a so-called now-for-now preference. Th at is to say, you prefer in the morning to have a 
hot shower in the morning. It is clear that this preference is irrelevant because you hold 
that turning the geyser on will allow you to have a hot shower in the afternoon. But in 
the afternoon you may not prefer the hot shower any longer. Th at our valuations are 
changing over time is all too obvious.
It might be objected at this point that now-for-now preferences are only irrelevant in 
our example and similar cases. But there is a general argument, which I can only sketch 
here, that shows that an agent’s now-for-now valuations are never reason-giving. It is 
logically possible that acting reverses an agent’s preferences. Suppose that an agent 
knows that due to his unfortunate psychological constitution, whenever he prefers x 
to y and chooses appropriate means for achieving x, then his preference changes. He 
then prefers y to x. If he knows this, he has no reason for choosing the means for what 
he now prefers. Given his knowledge, he has rather a justifying reason for choosing the 
means for what he does not prefer.11
(ii) It is, however, more likely that you have a now-for-then preference. You prefer in 
the morning that you can take a hot shower in the afternoon. Now, the fact that you have 
this preference does not provide you with a reason for acting. Th is can easily be seen 
if we assume that you know that your preference will change by the afternoon. If you 
prefer in the morning to take a hot shower in the afternoon and you know that in the 
afternoon you will want a cold shower, then you have no reason for turning the geyser 
on, despite your now-for-then preference in the morning.
What gives you a reason for acting, however, is your evidence that you will prefer a hot 
shower in the afternoon. Be it noted that this evidence can be reason-giving (given 
that the other necessary conditions are met) even if you do not prefer a hot shower 
in the afternoon. Suppose that in the morning you are justifi ed in believing that you 
will prefer a hot shower in the afternoon but in fact, due to unexpected very hot 
weather, you want then a cold shower. Obviously, you have nevertheless a justifi cation 
for turning the geyser on in the morning.
(iii) But maybe you have a then-for-then preference. You prefer in the afternoon that you 
take a hot shower in the afternoon. Th e fact that you have this preference is irrelevant 
10  See also Lenman (2009) who claims that “the fact that smoking a cigarette is pleasurable is a perfectly real, perfectly 
good justifying reason to smoke insofar as smoking really is pleasurable” (p. 2). It will become clear by the end of this 
subsection that this view is erroneous.
11  Please notice that I am assuming here that the agent is not pathological in the sense that whenever he chooses 
means for achieving y his preference changes again and he then prefers x. And so on, and so on.
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to your deliberation in the morning if you do not have a justifi cation (in the morning) 
for believing that you will want the hot shower in the afternoon. And if you have this 
justifi cation, you have a reason for turning the geyser on even if you want then a cold 
shower.
To summarize, I have been arguing that the fact that an agent has a preference is 
neither necessary nor suffi  cient for his having a justifi catory reason and that valuational 
evidence (i.e., evidence that he has a preference) is necessary for a reason. First, suppose 
you have evidence that you prefer a hot shower in the afternoon. You have then a 
reason for turning the geyser on. Th is shows that your preference is not necessary (after 
all, you can have this evidence even though you do in fact not prefer the hot shower 
in the afternoon). Second, suppose that you have evidence that you do not want a hot 
shower in the afternoon. You have then no reason for acting. Th is shows that the fact 
that you have a preference is not suffi  cient because you may have this evidence even 
though you actually want a hot shower in the afternoon. Th ird, assume that you have 
no reason for believing that you prefer a hot shower in the afternoon. Once again, you 
have then no reason for turning on the geyser, and this shows that valuational evidence 
is necessary for your having a reason.
Th is result, I think, is likely to encounter particular resistance, since it contradicts most 
standard theories of practical reasons, and I envisage the objection that it is counter-
intuitive. After all, in our everyday practical deliberations, we refer to valuations and 
not evidence for valuations. We hold that we have reason to take the umbrella because 
we want to stay dry and not because we have a justifi cation for believing that we 
want to stay dry. My reply is very simple, and runs as follows. Th at we need evidence 
is concealed in day to day deliberations because reasons, in the form in which they 
are commonly given, are elliptical. We seldom lay out a reason fully. For example, 
when someone claims that he has reason for taking the umbrella, then he knows (and 
therefore is justifi ed in believing) that he wants to stay dry. Th ere is not need to state 
this. However, if our valuations are not obvious, we tend to fall back on giving reasons. 
Suppose, for instance, that in a foreign country we have to choose between Rigatoni 
Alla Siciliana and Orecchiette con Rapini from a restaurant menu. We may collect 
information about both meals from the waiter and decide then to order, say, the former 
meal because we feel that we have now some evidence that we shall enjoy it more. 
Th ese brief remarks are only intended to show that the main result of this subsection is 
not as counter-intuitive as it may appear at fi rst sight.
2.4 Further conditions on valuational evidence
Th us far I have tried to show that justifi catory reasons require that an agent is justifi ed 
in believing that he prefers one state to another. In this subsection I shall argue that 
there are some further conditions that must be satisfi ed for an agent to have a justifying 
reason.
(i) Th e agent must have evidence that he will not only have the preference before the 
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outcome of his prospective act occurs. Th e argument is as follows. First, suppose you 
have evidence that you will prefer a hot shower at noon. Th is evidence does not give 
you a reason for switching the geyser on in the morning because you have a reason for 
believing that this will only allow you to take the hot shower in the afternoon. Cleary, 
your evidence that you prefer at noon to have the shower in the afternoon does not 
imply that you still have this preference in the afternoon. Second, if you are justifi ed 
in believing that you prefer in the afternoon to take a hot shower (in the afternoon), 
then, I conjecture, you have a justifi catory reason (given that the other conditions are 
met). Th ird, interestingly, you may have evidence that you have the preference later. 
If you have a justifi cation for believing that in the evening you will prefer that you had 
taken a hot shower in the afternoon, then you still have a reason for acting. I think it 
is clear that when you know in the morning that if you do not take a shower in the 
afternoon you will regret it in the evening (and therefore you will prefer that you had 
taken a shower in the afternoon), this gives you a reason for turning the geyser on in 
the morning.
(ii) Th e relata of an agent’s putative preference must occur simultaneously with the 
outcome of his action.12 (As I have already mentioned, preferences are dyadic valuations. 
If ‘a is preferred to b’, then ‘a’ and ‘b’ are the relata of this preference relation.) Let me 
illustrate this requirement by returning to our example. You have a justifi cation for 
believing that if you switch the geyser on in the morning you can take a hot shower in 
the afternoon and you are justifi ed in believing that in the afternoon you will prefer 
the hot shower to a cold one. So far, so good, but you also need evidence that in the 
afternoon you prefer to take the shower in the afternoon — not earlier and not later. 
Suppose you have evidence that in the afternoon you will prefer that you had taken 
the shower at noon. Since the consequence of your act occurs in the afternoon, this 
evidence would not give you a reason for turning the geyser on in the morning. On the 
other hand, if your evidence is that in the afternoon you will want to have the shower 
in the evening, your evidence is also not reason-giving. Th is can best be seen if we 
assume that you know that the water will no longer be hot in the evening.
Th e conditions discussed in this subsection may appear so obvious as to be hardly 
worth saying, but it is all too easy to overlook them in our everyday reasoning.
2.5 Concurrence of the justifi cations
In order to have a justifi catory reason, an agent must have the descriptive and valuational 
evidence at the same stretch of time. In so saying, I do not mean to imply that they 
have to begin and to end at the same time. What is required is rather that there is an 
interval of time when the agent has both of them. Th e reasons are briefl y as follows: 
12  For the sake of simplicity, I assume here simultaneity of the relata of preferences. Th at is to say, I assume that if an 
agent prefers x to y, then x and y occur at the same interval of time. Of course, this is not always the case. After opening 
the window I can prefer the pleasant cool to the previous heat. However, since such preferences do not pose a special 
problem for my account, this issue will not be touched on here.
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(i) Suppose the agent has the justifi cation for his beliefs before he has any valuational 
evidence. At 5 a.m., you have a justifi cation for believing that you can only have a 
hot shower in the afternoon if you turn on the geyser by 7 a.m., but only at 6 a.m. 
you acquire the evidence that you will want the shower at that time. Clearly, you have 
no reason at 5 a.m. for turning on the geyser because at that time you do not have 
evidence that you will want a shower; and you have no reason at 7 a.m. because, by 
hypothesis, at that time you are not any longer justifi ed in believing that you can have 
the shower if you turn the geyser on by 7 o’clock.
(ii) Now assume that you have acquired the descriptive justifi cation after the valuational 
evidence. At 5 a.m., you are justifi ed in believing that you want the shower in the 
afternoon and only at 6 a.m. you have a justifi cation for believing that you can have the 
shower if you turn the geyser on by 7 a.m. Once again, it is easy to see that you have 
no justifi catory reason for acting unless there is a temporal interval when you have both 
justifi cations — and you have the reason only as long as you have both of them.
An analysis of examples given by contemporary writers on practical reasoning reveals 
that they often tacitly imply simultaneity of the descriptive evidence and the valuations. 
I have, however, already argued that valuations as such are not reason-giving. If I am 
right about this, then it is simultaneity of the two types of justifi cation that is a necessary 
condition for practical reasons rather than simultaneity of descriptive evidence and 
valuations.
2.6 Must preferences be backed up by reasons?
Some authors, notably decision theorists, hold that if some formal conditions are met, 
you have a reason to φ if φ–ing is related in an appropriate way to any goal which you 
actually have.13 Th is, however, is in philosophy a minority opinion and many hold that 
you have only a reason for taking the means to an end if you have a reason to pursue 
that end (see Korsgaard 1997, 223).14 But also this view is not generally accepted 
without qualifi cation. According to the standard Humean account of practical reasons, 
we need to distinguish between derivative and non-derivative (“basic”) valuations; and 
an agent has a reason to do what he believes would satisfy his “basic” desires. Derivative 
desires depend on other, more basic, valuations and beliefs of the agent; and they are 
only reason-giving if they are based on justifi ed (or true) beliefs.
13  For example, Simon (1983) claims that “reason is wholly instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can 
tell us how to get there. It is a gun for hire that can be employed in the service of any goals that we have, good or bad.” 
Maurice Allais, another prominent decision theorist, is quoted by Broome (1995, 104-5) as saying, “It cannot be too 
strongly emphasized that there are no criteria for the rationality of ends as such other than the condition of consistency. 
Ends are completely arbitrary.” Some philosophers have endorsed this view. For instance, Bertrand Russell (1954) has 
held that reason “has nothing whatever to do with the choice of ends,” it only requires choosing the right means “to an 
end that you wish to achieve” (p. 8).
14  Hubin (2001) characterizes this view as holding that “no reasons will be transmitted to the means unless there is a 
reason for the ends“ (p. 462). See also Schroeder (2007).
Georg Spielthenner |  Justifi catory reasons for action
66
It should be clear by now in which way I disagree with this Humean orthodoxy. 
Valuations as such are not reason-giving; only the evidence that we value something 
can provide us with justifying reasons. Th is raises, however, the question whether these 
valuations need to be justifi ed. My answer is Humean in spirit. In this subsection, I 
shall argue that if an agent has reason to believe that his preference is non-derivative 
there is no need to justify it. However, if he has no such reason, then he needs to show 
that it is justifi ed. I think that this latter claim is uncontroversial, and I shall therefore 
give only one example to illustrate it. Homer’s hero Odysseus has himself tied to the 
mast of his ship so that he can hear the sirens’ sweet song without, later, being driven 
to follow their seductive sound and perish. His preference to be tied on the mast was 
derivative. He had it because he believed that if he was not prevented from escaping he 
would follow the sirens and die. His preference was therefore in need of justifi cation.
But there has been much dispute over the view of Humeans that non-derivative 
valuations are reason-giving despite the fact that they cannot be backed up by reasons. 
In what follows I shall argue that they are (mutatis mutandis) right. Th is requires (i) 
explaining the nature of non-derivative valuations and (ii) showing that they provide 
reasons despite the fact that they are not rationally criticisable. Let’s consider these 
issues in turn.
(i) Non-derivative valuations have often been identifi ed with intrinsic desires. 
Th erefore, neo-Humeans commonly hold that the basis of an agent’s reasons are his 
intrinsic valuings (see, e.g., Hubin 1999 and Shemmer 2004).15 However, the concept 
of intrinsic valuations is elusive and some clarifi cations are therefore called for.
Th ere is wide (though not universal) consensus that an agent values a thing intrinsically 
if he values it on account of its internal properties. Some have claimed that these 
internal properties are non-relational properties (e.g. being spherical),16 but others 
have argued that internally relational properties – i.e., properties a thing has “in virtue 
of the relations it has to its own parts (components, elements, constituents, etc.” – are 
also internal (see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000, 34). If I value Mozart’s 
piano sonata K331 on account of its celebrated Alla turca movement, then I value it on 
the basis of one of its parts, but still intrinsically.
Since we value something intrinsically if we value it in virtue of its internal properties, 
many authors have held that valuing x intrinsically is tantamount to valuing x for its 
own sake. On this view, an agent values x for its own sake if he values x in virtue of 
what it is in itself, independently of other objects.17 Th is has been plausibly criticised, 
15  Th ere are, however, variants of neo-Humeanism that ground an agent’s reason on her values, rather than on her 
intrinsic desires (see Hubin 2003). I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal for alerting me to 
this.
16  See, for instance, Korsgaard (1983) who distinguishes diff erent types of values.
17  Among the many authors who have identifi ed intrinsic valuations with valuations for its own sake are Brandt 
(1969-70), Quinn (1974) and Shemmer (2004).
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however, by authors who have argued that we can value a thing for its own sake if we 
value it on account of its relational features to other things.18 Let a single example serve 
to illustrate this. Some people value Mozart’s Requiem less when they learn that much 
of it is the work of his pupil Süssmayr (due to Mozart’s untimely death). Th is shows 
that their valuation depends on a relational property of this piece of music to another 
thing (its composer). It is not only valued on the basis of its internal properties and 
thus it is not valued intrinsically. But it has been held that a valuation of this kind is 
still for its own sake.
Be that as it may, the point to emphasize now is that non-derivative valuations are 
neither intrinsic valuations nor valuations of a thing for its own sake. Both of them 
are derivative valuations. Th at is to say, when we value a thing intrinsically or for its 
own sake, we value it for a reason. I may value Mozart’s sonata K331 because I think its 
third movement is the Alla turca, and I may value his Requiem less because I believe 
that much of it was composed by his pupil. In both cases, my valuation depends on 
something that I believe about the valued thing. My valuations are therefore open to 
rational criticism and they are rationally defective if the beliefs on which they depend 
are unjustifi ed.
Non-derivative valuations are diff erent. If we value a thing non-derivatively we value 
it independently of the relations we believe it bears to its parts or to other objects and 
states of aff airs. If you disvalue pain non-derivatively you may hold beliefs about it 
(e.g. that it is a symptom of a disease), but your disvaluing does not depend on these 
beliefs. It is directly based on your experience. Non-derivative valuings are therefore 
non-cognitive attitudes towards things and do not depend on our “intellectual faculties” 
(to borrow a term from Hume).19
(ii) At the beginning of this subsection I have said that irrational valuations are not 
reason-giving. Th erefore, we must now deal with the question whether non-derivative 
valuations can be irrational. I am being brief here because the details are not important 
for us.
Two diff erent argumentative strategies have been employed by philosophers to 
show that non-derivative valuations can be irrational. Th e fi rst involves presenting 
arguments that are based on alternative accounts of what makes a valuation irrational 
– for instance, being unintelligible or being rationally arbitrary. Th ese arguments have 
been convincingly refuted by Hubin (1991) and we can therefore safely ignore them 
here. Th e second line of attack is simply to describe cases where our intuitions seem 
to tell us that a desire is irrational. Examples of such whims and “crazy desires” are the 
vertiginous urge to fl ing yourself from the balcony (Cohon 2000, 63), the desire to 
18  See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000, 39-42) and Kagan (1998) who have argued for this, albeit in dif-
ferent ways.
19  See, for instance, Beardman (2007, 256), Hubin (1991, 23), and Setiya (2004, 371).
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be a successful axe-murderer (Schroeder 2007, 120), a mother’s sudden urge to drown 
her brawling child in the bath (Watson 1975, 210), the desire for pain (Audi 2004, 
126), or the urge to bite a piece out of this table (Searle 2001, 132) – and this list 
is by no means exhaustive. Th ese examples are, however, particularly unconvincing 
because the authors have never made clear that these desires are non-derivative in the 
sense explained above, and they do not always appreciate the fact that non-derivative 
valuations can only create pro tanto reasons, which can, of course, be defeated by other 
reasons available. I therefore agree with Hubin (1991; 2001) that such whims do not 
pose special problems for the view that non-derivative valuations are not rationally 
criticisable and therefore not irrational.20
Non-derivative valuations are, by defi nition, not based on reasons. On the Humean 
tradition, to which I align myself here, valuations can be irrational only if the factors 
on which they are based are rationally defective. In other words, a rational evaluation 
of preferences or desires requires evaluating the reasons on which they are based. Non-
derivative valuations are not based on any reasons and hence they are not rationally 
criticisable. We can, of course, examine the causes and consequences of such valuations 
but not the reasons on which they are based. Th ere are none. Non-derivative valuations 
do not admit of justifi cation and they are thus neither rational nor irrational. Th ey are 
arational.
Let me summarize this. In this subsection I have endorsed the widely accepted view 
that derivative valuations are not reason-giving if they are not justifi ed. I have then 
argued that non-derivative valuations are not irrational but arational; and in accordance 
with the Humean tradition, I have therefore held (but not demonstrated) that such 
valuations can provide reasons for acting. Th is does not, of course, imply that it is always 
rational to satisfy such valuations because they can only provide pro tanto reasons and 
such reasons are commonly defeated by other reasons.
Let us now apply these results to our example. In the morning you have evidence 
that you prefer in the afternoon a hot shower to a cold shower. If you think you 
have this preference because a hot shower will relax you, your preference is derivative 
and in need of justifi cation. However, if you know that you prefer the hot shower 
non-derivatively (for no further reason) then it is arational and thus not rationally 
appraisable. Nonetheless, it can create a pro tanto reason for switching on the geyser 
(given that the other necessary conditions are satisfi ed).
20  Hubin (2001) has claimed that non-derivative desires “can be instrumentally irrational in the sense that one has 
reason to extinguish them“ (p. 457). Th is, I am afraid to say, is a mistake. I may have a reason to rid myself of my crav-
ing for sweets. But this does not mean that this desire is irrational. It would be irrational to satisfy this desire, but be it 
noted that this does not make the desire irrational. To make this clearer, let us consider another example. An introvert 
may have a reason to rid himself of his want to be left by himself. His desire may be unfortunate, but it is in no way 
irrational.
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2.7 Warrant for logical support
Even if all necessary conditions that I have discussed thus far are satisfi ed, an agent 
does still not have a reason for acting unless he has a warrant that his descriptive and 
valuational evidence (taken together) logically support his action. Th at is to say, a set 
of premises of a piece of practical reasoning constitutes a justifying reason only if the 
reasoner is justifi ed in believing that this set logically supports the conclusion.21
Th e fact that there is such a logical relationship is not reason-giving. A comparison with 
theoretical reasoning may help to make this clear. A student has reason for believing 
that a certain shape is a right triangle. Th is does not justify his belief that the square on 
this triangle’s hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on its two legs – despite 
the fact that this is deducible from the student’s evidence. Obviously, the student’s 
evidence about the triangle provides him only with a reason for holding the conclusion 
if he has a justifi cation for believing that the conclusion is deducible from his premise-
belief.
Th is point holds in practical reasoning also. For illustration, take a simple example 
from non-probabilistic reasoning under uncertainty (that is, reasoning when we are 
facing problems that are so vague that we cannot assign probabilities). 68-year-old Mr 
Goldman had lost the vision in his left eye and now his right eye has deteriorated due 
to a cataract.22 Even with glasses, his corrected visual acuity is now only 20/50. His 
doctor raised the possibility of cataract surgery but was not able to estimate the chances 
of successful surgery (which would restore his visual acuity to 20/30). However, he was 
sure that unsuccessful surgery would erode his vision to 20/100. Goldman considers 
his two options “cataract surgery” and “no cataract surgery”. If he chooses surgery his 
vision may be restored to 20/30 acuity, but it can also deteriorate to 20/100 acuity. If 
he refuses to have surgery his vision remains at 20/50.
It is so diffi  cult to decide whether Mr Goldman has a reason for surgery rather than 
against it because we do not know what conclusion is supported by the premises. 
According to the so-called Maximin Principle, we have to fi nd for each alternative the 
worst outcome and then choose the option for which the worst outcome is best. Mr 
Goldman should therefore choose “no surgery”. On the other hand, according to the 
Maximax Principle (which requires fi nding the best outcome for each option and then 
choosing the action for which this best outcome is largest), Mr. Goldman’s premises 
support undergoing cataract surgery.
21  Th is issue has been extensively discussed in epistemology. Th e question has been whether justifi cation (or knowl-
edge) is closed under entailment. Many philosophers have held that if a person is justifi ed in believing p and knows 
(or justifi edly believes) that p entails q, then he is justifi ed in believing q. Be it noted that I am here not committed to 
this view because I only hold the weaker claim that if an agent is justifi ed in believing the premises of a valid practical 
argument but is not justifi ed in believing that these premises entail the conclusion, then he has no justifi catory reason 
for preferring one action to its alternatives.
22  Th e example has been adapted from Hammond, J. S., Keeney, R. L., and Raiff a, H. (1999). Smart choices. New 
York: Broadway Books, pp. 131-133.
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We can put the upshot of this subsection succinctly as follows: If we are not justifi ed in 
believing that the premises of a piece of reasoning logically support φ-ing, then these 
premises do not provide a justifying reason for φ-ing.
3. Conclusion
Th e question I have been addressing in this paper is “What are the requirements for 
an agent to have a justifi catory reason for acting?” Th e results of this investigation may 
be summarized as follows. You have no justifi catory reason for φ-ing if you have no 
evidence that φ-ing is a necessary means for one of your ends (2.1), if you do not have 
this evidence at the time when you need to perform this action (2.2), and if you are 
not justifi ed for believing that you will value the outcome of this act at the time when 
it occurs (2.3 and 2.4). In addition, you need to have the descriptive and valuational 
evidence at the same time (2.5) and your valuation needs to be justifi ed if it is derivative 
(2.6). Finally, I have tried to show that it is a necessary condition for justifi catory 
reasons that you are justifi ed in believing that the premises of your reasoning logically 
support the conclusion (2.7). Returning to our example, we can therefore say that you 
have no justifi catory reason for turning on the geyser in the morning before you leave 
the hut for a climb if these necessary conditions are not satisfi ed.
Th is may seem a surprising thing to say because it implies that most accounts of 
“desire-dependent” reasons, neo-Humeanism included, are defective. Nonetheless, 
I conjecture that a closer examination of the results of this study reveals that these 
theories are indeed misguided.
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